@article {2736, title = {Changing minds: Children{\textquoteright}s inferences about third party belief revision}, journal = {Developmental Science}, year = {2017}, month = {05/2017}, pages = {e12553}, abstract = {

By the age of five, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs

based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, \& Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpenter \& Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children{\textquoteright}s expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties{\textquoteright} belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children{\textquoteright}s inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.\ 

}, keywords = {learning, rational action, theory of mind}, doi = {10.1111/desc.12553}, author = {Rachel Magid and Phyllis Yan and Max Siegel and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Laura Schulz} } @article {2737, title = {Moral alchemy: How love changes norms}, journal = {Cognition}, volume = {167}, year = {2017}, month = {10/2017}, pages = {135 -150}, chapter = {135}, abstract = {

We discuss a process by which non-moral concerns (that is concerns agreed to be non-moral

within a particular cultural context) can take on moral content. We refer to this phenomenon as moral alchemy and suggest that it arises because moral obligations of care entail recursively valuing loved ones{\textquoteright} values, thus allowing propositions with no moral weight in themselves to become morally charged. Within this framework, we predict that when people believe a loved one cares about a behavior more than they do themselves, the moral imperative to care about the loved one{\textquoteright}s interests will raise the value of that behavior, such that people will be more likely to infer that third parties will see the behavior as wrong (Experiment 1) and the behavior itself as more morally important (Experiment 2) than when the same behaviors are considered outside the context of a caring relationship. The current study confirmed these predictions.\ 

}, keywords = {Ethics of care, Moral learning, Recursive value, Utility}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.003}, url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027717300689}, author = {Rachel Magid and Laura Schulz} } @article {1195, title = {Imagination and the generation of new ideas}, journal = {Cognitive Development}, volume = {34}, year = {2015}, month = {April{\textendash}June 2015}, pages = {99{\textendash}110}, doi = {10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.12.008}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0885201414000744}, author = {Rachel Magid}, editor = {Mark Sheskin} } @proceedings {1203, title = {Quit while you{\textquoteright}re ahead: Preschoolers{\textquoteright} persistence and willingness to accept challenges are affected by social comparison.}, year = {2015}, month = {07/2015}, address = {Pasadena, CA}, author = {Rachel Magid and Laura Schulz} } @conference {1298, title = {Preschoolers expect others to learn rationally from evidence}, booktitle = {Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, year = {2014}, abstract = {

Even infants expect agents to act rationally in pursuit of their\  goals. However, little research has looked at whether young\  children expect other agents to learn rationally. In the\  current study, we investigated 4.5- to 6-year-olds{\textquoteright} reasoning\  about another agent{\textquoteright}s beliefs after the agent observed a\  sample drawn randomly or selectively from a population.\  We found that those children who could correctly track both\  the true state of the world and the other agent{\textquoteright}s initial beliefs\  expected the other agent to learn rationally from the data.\  Critically, this inference depended upon but could not be\  reduced to either the child{\textquoteright}s own understanding of the world,\  or the child{\textquoteright}s own inferences from the sampling process,\  suggesting that the ability to integrate these component\  processes underlies a developing understanding of the way\  in which evidence informs others{\textquoteright} beliefs.

}, keywords = {learning, rational action, theory of mind}, author = {Phyllis Yan and Rachel Magid and Laura Schulz} }