@proceedings {4261, title = {Draping an Elephant: Uncovering Children{\textquoteright}s Reasoning About Cloth-Covered Objects}, year = {2019}, month = {07/2019}, address = {Montreal, Canada}, abstract = {

Humans have an intuitive understanding of physics. They can predict how a physical scene will unfold, and reason about how it came to be. Adults may rely on such a physical representation for visual reasoning and recognition, going beyond visual features and capturing objects in terms of their physical properties. Recently, the use of draped objects in recognition was used to examine adult object representations in the absence of many common visual features. In this paper we examine young children{\textquoteright}s reasoning about draped objects in order to examine the develop of physical object representation. In addition, we argue that a better understanding of the development of the concept of cloth as a physical entity is worthwhile in and of itself, as it may form a basic ontological category in intuitive physical reasoning akin to liquids and solids. We use two experiments to investigate young children{\textquoteright}s (ages 3{\textendash}5) reasoning about cloth-covered objects, and find that they perform significantly above chance (though far from perfectly) indicating a representation of physical objects that can interact dynamically with the world. Children{\textquoteright}s success and failure pattern is similar across the two experiments, and we compare it to adult behavior. We find a small effect, which suggests the specific features that make reasoning about certain objects more difficult may carry into adulthood.

}, keywords = {analysis-by-synthesis, cloth, cognitive development, imagination, intuitive physics, object recognition, occlusion, perception, vision}, url = {https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2019/papers/0506/index.html}, author = {Tomer D Ullman and Eliza Kosoy and Ilker Yildirim and Amir Arsalan Soltani and Max Siegel and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Elizabeth S Spelke} } @article {2736, title = {Changing minds: Children{\textquoteright}s inferences about third party belief revision}, journal = {Developmental Science}, year = {2017}, month = {05/2017}, pages = {e12553}, abstract = {

By the age of five, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs

based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, \& Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpenter \& Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children{\textquoteright}s expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties{\textquoteright} belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children{\textquoteright}s inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.\ 

}, keywords = {learning, rational action, theory of mind}, doi = {10.1111/desc.12553}, author = {Rachel Magid and Phyllis Yan and Max Siegel and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Laura Schulz} } @conference {1803, title = {Perceiving Fully Occluded Objects with Physical Simulation}, booktitle = {Cognitive Science Conference (CogSci)}, year = {2015}, month = {07/2015}, address = {Pasadena, CA}, author = {Ilker Yildirim and Max Siegel and Joshua B. Tenenbaum} }