@article {3514, title = {Lucky or clever? From changed expectations to attributions of responsibility}, journal = {Cognition}, year = {2018}, month = {08/2018}, author = {Tobias Gerstenberg and Ullman, Tomer D. and Nagel, Jonas and Max Kleiman-Weiner and D. A. Lagnado and Joshua B. Tenenbaum} } @proceedings {3445, title = {Causal learning from interventions and dynamics in continuous time}, year = {2017}, abstract = {

Event timing and interventions are important and intertwined cues to causal structure, yet they have typically been studied separately. We bring them together for the first time in an ex- periment where participants learn causal structure by performing interventions in continuous time. We contrast learning in acyclic and cyclic devices, with reliable and unreliable cause{\textendash} effect delays. We show that successful learners use interventions to structure and simplify their interactions with the de- vices and that we can capture judgment patterns with heuristics based on online construction and testing of a single structural hypothesis.

}, author = {Neil Bramley and Ralf Mayrhofer and Tobias Gerstenberg and D. A. Lagnado} } @article {3088, title = {Eye-Tracking Causality}, journal = {Psychological Science}, volume = {73}, year = {2017}, month = {10/2017}, abstract = {

How do people make causal judgments? What role, if any, does counterfactual simulation play? Counterfactual theories of causal judgments predict that people compare what actually happened with what would have happened if the candidate cause had been absent. Process theories predict that people focus only on what actually happened, to assess the mechanism linking candidate cause and outcome. We tracked participants{\textquoteright} eye movements while they judged whether one billiard ball caused another one to go through a gate or prevented it from going through. Both participants{\textquoteright} looking patterns and their judgments demonstrated that counterfactual simulation played a critical role. Participants simulated where the target ball would have gone if the candidate cause had been removed from the scene. The more certain participants were that the outcome would have been different, the stronger the causal judgments. These results provide the first direct evidence for spontaneous counterfactual simulation in an important domain of high-level cognition.

}, keywords = {causality, counterfactuals, eye tracking, intuitive physics, mental simulation, open data, open materials}, issn = {0956-7976}, doi = {10.1177/0956797617713053}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797617713053}, author = {Tobias Gerstenberg and M.F. Peterson and Noah D. Goodman and D. A. Lagnado and Joshua B. Tenenbaum} } @article {3444, title = {Eye-Tracking Causality}, journal = {Psychological Science}, year = {2017}, abstract = {

How do people make causal judgments? What role, if any, does counterfactual simulation play? Counterfactual theories of causal judgments predict that people compare what actually happened with what would have happened if the candidate cause had been absent. Process theories predict that people focus only on what actually happened, to assess the mechanism linking candidate cause and outcome. We tracked participants{\textquoteright} eye movements while they judged whether one billiard ball caused another one to go through a gate or prevented it from going through. Both participants{\textquoteright} looking patterns and their judgments demonstrated that counterfactual simulation played a critical role. Participants simulated where the target ball would have gone if the candidate cause had been removed from the scene. The more certain participants were that the outcome would have been different, the stronger the causal judgments. These results provide the first direct evidence for spontaneous counterfactual simulation in an important domain of high-level cognition.

}, keywords = {causality, counterfactuals, eye tracking, intuitive physics, mental simulation}, author = {Tobias Gerstenberg and M.F. Peterson and Noah D. Goodman and D. A. Lagnado and Joshua B. Tenenbaum} } @proceedings {755, title = {How, whether, why: Causal judgments as counterfactual contrasts}, year = {2015}, month = {07/22/2015}, pages = {782-787}, address = {Pasadena, CA}, issn = {978-0-9911967-2-2}, url = {https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2015/papers/0142/index.html}, author = {Tobias Gerstenberg and Noah D. Goodman and D. A. Lagnado and Joshua B. Tenenbaum} }