

Origins of the concepts cause, cost, and goal in prereaching infants

Shari Liu, Neon Brooks, & Elizabeth Spelke Harvard University, Center for Brains Minds and Machines (CBMM)

Before their first birthdays, infants become sensitive to other people's:



physical properties [1]



intentions and goals [2]



causal powers [3]



effort [4]

Motor experience plays a causal role in acquiring this knowledge [5-7], but **what role**?

Hypothesis: Infants learn about the causal structure of specific actions (e.g. grasping an object can cause it to lift) from motor experience

Empirical Prediction: If this is true, then we should be able to give them this information visually, without intervening on their motor experience

Methods: 5 experiments, N=152 3-month-old infants (range 91-122 days)

Exp	Ν	Goal	Hand	Action over barrier	Action on contact	St
1	20	pick up	glove	yes	yes	H
2	20		bare	yes	yes	H
3	20	state change	glove	yes	yes	Η
	20		glove	no	yes	H
4	20		glove	yes	no	H
5*	26		glove	yes	yes	H
	26		glove	yes	no	H

*pre-registered direct replication

Analysis: Linear mixed effects models, random intercepts for participants and experiments **DV**: Average looking time in log seconds towards the inefficient and efficient test event

Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 69(1), 1–34. 10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00058-4 [3] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants' causal representations of state change events. Cognitive Psychology, 61(2), 63- 86. [4] Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naïve theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(7), 287–292. [5] Sommerville, J. A., & Woodward, A. L. (2005). Pulling . E. & Spelke, E. S. (2013). First-person action experience attion between action experience atters 3-month-old infants. Proceedings in fants. Proceedings i 10 (46), 18728–33. [8] Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants expect agents to minimize the cost of their actions. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants expect agents to minimize the cost of their actions. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants expect agents to minimize the cost of their actions. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants expect agents to minimize the cost of their actions. Cognition, 160, 35-42. [10] Muentener, P., & Carey, S. (2010). Infants expect agents to minimize the cost of the value of 63–86. **Contact**: Shari Liu, shariliued@gmail.com

3, T3

Three-month-old infants appreciate that other people make things happen.

constraineel



This ability helps them see reaching actions as physically



Main Finding: Untrained prereaching infants looked longer at inefficient than efficient reaching actions when these actions caused a simple, spatiotemporally continuous state change in an object.

Meta-analytic results over the current research and Skerry et al. (2013) [7]:



Take-Home Messages:

- 1. Infants see actions they cannot yet perform as goal-directed, causal, and physically constrained
- 2. Motor experience is not the only path to this knowledge
- 3. Over development, infants face the hard learning problem of figuring out which objects are goals, which actions are hard and easy, and how acting causes people to achieve their goals



Current and Future Directions: Investigating early concepts of • goal: object identity vs location [8]?

- cost: continuous [9]?
- cause: agentic vs physical [10]?

Open data, code, and materials:









