@article {5078,
	title = {Moral dynamics: Grounding moral judgment in intuitive physics and intuitive psychology},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {217},
	year = {2021},
	month = {05/2021},
	pages = {104890},
	abstract = {<p>When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditionally, research in moral psychology has relied on vignette studies, in which a protagonist{\textquoteright}s actions and thoughts are explicitly communicated. While this research has revealed what variables are important for moral judgment, such as actions and intentions, it is limited in providing a more detailed understanding of exactly how these variables affect moral judgment. Using dynamic visual stimuli that allow for a more fine-grained experimental control, recent studies have proposed a direct mapping from visual features to moral judgments. We embrace the use of visual stimuli in moral psychology, but question the plausibility of a feature-based theory of moral judgment. We propose that the connection from visual features to moral judgments is mediated by an inference about what the observed action reveals about the agent{\textquoteright}s mental states, and what causal role the agent{\textquoteright}s action played in bringing about the outcome. We present a computational model that formalizes moral judgments of agents in visual scenes as computations over an intuitive theory of physics combined with an intuitive theory of mind. We test the model{\textquoteright}s quantitative predictions in three experiments across a wide variety of dynamic interactions between agent and patient.</p>
},
	issn = {00100277},
	doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104890},
	url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027721003139},
	author = {Sosa, Felix A. and Ullman, Tomer and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Samuel J Gershman and Gerstenberg, Tobias}
}
@article {4508,
	title = {Judgments of effort for magical violations of intuitive physics},
	journal = {PLOS ONE},
	volume = {14},
	year = {2019},
	month = {05/2020},
	pages = {e0217513},
	abstract = {<p>People spend much of their time in imaginary worlds, and have beliefs about the events that are likely in those worlds, and the laws that govern them. Such beliefs are likely affected by people{\textquoteright}s intuitive theories of the real world. In three studies, people judged the effort required to cast spells that cause physical violations. People ranked the actions of spells congruently with intuitive physics. For example, people judge that it requires more effort to conjure up a frog than to levitate it one foot off the ground. A second study manipulated the target and extent of the spells, and demonstrated with a continuous measure that people are sensitive to this manipulation even between participants. A pre-registered third study replicated the results of Study 2. These results suggest that people{\textquoteright}s intuitive theories partly account for how they think about imaginary worlds.</p>
},
	doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.021751310.1371},
	url = {http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217513},
	author = {John P. McCoy and Ullman, Tomer},
	editor = {Capraro, Valerio}
}
